


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World-wide Perspectives



KEY DATES

15 August - 20 Years of Indian Independence

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3 September - South Vietnamese General Elections

7 November - 50th Anniversary of Bolshevik Revolution

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Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs

(to 20 July 1967)

1. Rumania, which had attended the 9 June Moscow summit of 7 European Communist states on the Arab-Israeli conflict but refused to sign the joint statement blaming Israel and which refused to join them in breaking relations with Israel, does not participate in and publicly ignores an 11-12 July follow-up meeting of the others in Budapest. (Meanwhile, large Soviet deliveries of military hardware to the Arab states since the June debacle went far toward replacing the material lost.) In the interim, Moscow announced (7 July) that its Marshal Yakubovsky is the new Warsaw Pact military commander, after the post had remained vacant 3 months following Marshal Grechko's accession to the deceased Malinovsky's job as Soviet Defense Minister: it has been reported that the delay was due largely to Rumanian and Polish proposals that the post be rotated among Pact members. By 15 July, correspondents in Moscow and The Hague (where a Rumanian delegation made a 5-day visit) report rumors that Rumania plans to announce a phased withdrawal from the WP at its next parliamentary session. Also, on 5 July Rumanian Premier was reported holding secret talks with Chinese leaders in Peking, although there has not been any acknowledgment of his visit thus far.

2. Cuba: bars Yugoslav participation in the forthcoming LASO conference; becomes the first country to designate an ambassador to the NFLSV (its ambassador accredited to Cambodia is the man); and carries its first media attack on the Colombian CP (in a 21 June PRENSA LATINA summary of an article from the Mexican journal SUCESOS, based on author Rodriguez' visit with the Castroite Colombian ELN).

3. An 11 July Soviet announcement that CC Secretary Shelepin had been downgraded to succeed Grishin as Trade Union boss -- following the ouster in June of Moscow Party chief Yegorychev, whom Grishin replaced, and in May of security police chief Semichastny -- brings press speculation by Kremlinologists on a widening split in the hierarchy between the hard-liners and the moderates (or the "hawks" and the "doves"), with these three removals signifying further strengthening of control by the moderates.

4. There was no apparent change in the chaotic churning of Mao's "cultural revolution" in China. A 1 July RED FLAG editorial on the 46th anniversary of the CCP draws attention in its claim that the acknowledged leader of the opposition, Liu Shao-chi ("the top party person taking the capitalist road") had been "exposed and overthrown," -- but it appears that this did not refer to any specific development and that Liu still holds his position as nominal chief of state. The ChiComs further complete their international isolation as Red Guard arrogance among Chinese students in Rangoon precipitates Burmese clashes, demonstrations, and anti-Chinese riots, -- to which Peking retaliates with

(Cont.)

the usual mass demonstrations at the Burmese Embassy, stern demands, -- and transmittal via NCNA of a call from the outlawed Burmese CP for the Burmese people to rise up and overthrow the Ne Win government. Similar violence on a smaller scale is precipitated by ChiCom propaganda activities in Nepal. The clash with the formerly friendly Burmese Government brings a major blow to Chinese propaganda capabilities as the pro-Peking Communist daily LUDU in Mandalay -- the leading newspaper in mid-Burma, with an estimated circulation of 8,000, and the source of many items which the Peking press has replayed to show "Burmese support" for the Maoist line -- was closed down 8 July by govt refusal to renew its publication permit.

5. While Chinese and Soviet media continue to carry heavy recriminations, PRAVDA on 19 July carries the most detailed account yet of border incidents between the two in a report by senior writer Simonov following a trip along the Amur River border.

6. The Soviet-urged call for a world CP meeting is again endorsed in a joint communique covering a 4-10 July visit of a French CP delegation in Prague.

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August 1967

USSR "RADIO PEACE AND PROGRESS" PROGRAMS

Mandarin-language broadcasts of the USSR's "Radio Peace and Progress," the purportedly unofficial radio station sponsored by Soviet public organizations, were increased on 10 July from 31.5 hours to 52.5 hours weekly.

With the 1 July expansion of programming in Radio Peace and Progress transmissions in Hebrew/Yiddish, the total weekly broadcast time of "Radio Peace and Progress" has now reached 92 hours. The transmissions continue to be heard in eight languages. Creole, English, French, Hebrew, Mandarin, Portuguese, Spanish, and Yiddish.

The inception of Radio Peace and Progress was announced by TASS in July 1964. The station was first intercepted on 1 November 1964 in a half-hour program in Spanish, repeated the same evening, with both transmissions announced for Latin America. These programs were broadcast on frequencies formerly used to transmit a Spanish-language broadcast of the official Radio Moscow.

On 16 April 1965 Radio Peace and Progress inaugurated broadcasts in Portuguese, beamed to Brazil for a half-hour daily. This program also replaced a Radio Moscow Portuguese-language program.

After continuing without program or transmission changes for 18 months, Radio Peace and Progress instituted five new services on 10 November 1966 -- in French for Central America, Asia, and Africa and in English for Asia and Africa. The new Peace and Progress programs in French for Central America and for Asia replaced Radio Moscow programs for those audiences. But the new transmissions in French to Africa did not displace existing Radio Moscow broadcasts, and only one of the new English-language transmissions (to Africa) displaced a Radio Moscow program.

Mandarin transmissions

Radio Peace and Progress inaugurated daily broadcasts in Mandarin on 1 March this year -- an original 30-minute program repeated three times. Three of the four transmissions displaced Radio Moscow Mandarin-language programs. A succession of increases in the Mandarin broadcasts by Radio Peace and Progress has brought the total to 15 daily 30-minute programs. Comprising two original programs and a total of 13 repeat transmissions.

Observations after 10 July showed the latest increase in Radio Peace and Progress programs in Mandarin was exactly counterbalanced by a reduction in Radio Moscow's Mandarin-language transmissions, with no

cont.

net change in the total transmissions in Mandarin from the USSR. Thus the USSR's total time on the air in Mandarin -- via Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress, taken together -- remains 182 hours a week. Apart from 10.5 hours a week over Radio Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia, all of these broadcasts are for listeners in China. The Radio Peace and Progress broadcasts, totaling 52.5 hours a week, now constitute nearly one-third of the USSR's output to China, illustrating the trend toward increasing use of this self-styled unofficial radio channel.

14 July 1967

DE GAULLE BOIT A « L'ALLEMAGNE TOUTENTIERE » ET A LA PETITE EUROPE

Le général de Gaulle est rentré hier après-midi de son voyage à Bonn, laissant aux exégètes allemands l'examen d'une déclaration faite la veille en séance plénière et qui est plutôt une version édulcorée d'un thème largement traité dans ses conférences de presse que l'annonce d'un changement quelconque dans les positions de l'Elysée (voir ci-dessous).

En clair, les U.S.A., « devenus la plus grande puissance mondiale », ont une tendance naturelle à exercer leur hégémonie. Le général de Gaulle veut bien admettre qu'il n'éprouve pour eux « ni hostilité, ni aversion », ce que certains développements récents ne sont pas sans démentir quelque peu... En tout cas, il faut résister à cette hégémonie. L'Europe des Six doit garder sa « personnalité nationale » ; elle ne doit pas « se disloquer » dans un « système atlantique » ; elle doit « poursuivre une politique de détente avec l'Est.

M. Couve de Murville a expliqué à l'O.R.T.F., hier soir, qu'il n'y avait « rien de nouveau » dans les propos tenus par le général de Gaulle. C'est un fait. S'il a fait aux Allemands la grâce d'affirmer « qu'il ne souhaitait pas que les Américains s'en aillent d'Europe » — France exceptée, bien entendu — il n'a rien cédé sur la Grande-Bretagne qui, selon la pensée de l'Elysée, entraînerait la Communauté des « Six » dans cet inacceptable « système atlantique ».

L'insistance avec laquelle le général de Gaulle a parlé de la nécessaire réunification de l'Allemagne laissera songeur Moscou, qui avait pu entrevoir un règlement européen à fondements franco-soviétiques. La R.D.A. n'est pas près d'être reconnue. Or, l'U.R.S.S. tient essentiellement à son existence, au point du reste que l'on ne parle même plus en R.F.A. de cette réunification. Le général de Gaulle est-il au fond de lui-même si convaincu de cette nécessité ? On peut en douter sérieusement. Mais, dans sa volonté de mener une politique « indépendante des blocs », le président de la République est tenu de « tenir deux fers au feu ». Cet équilibre tient du prodige et peut durer, à condition bien entendu qu'une crise grave n'oblige pas à choisir entre l'une des deux faces de Janus.

Les Allemands méditeront d'autre part sur cette idée de sauvegarder la « personnalité de l'Europe des Six ». L'image est toute nouvelle, et inspirée sans aucun doute par le désir d'en écarter l'Angleterre. Jusqu'à présent, le Président de la République énumérait plus volontiers les six « personnalités nationales » des pays de la C.E.E. et se souciait comme d'une

guigne de la création d'une seule personnalité, ce qui bien sûr suppose l'intégration. L'Elysée s'est découvert des raisons de « jouer le jeu à Six ». Il a été confirmé que la France envisage avec faveur la tenue d'un nouveau « sommet » des Six avant la fin de l'année, qui sera sans aucun doute assez compromis s'il est même refusé à la Grande-Bretagne la possibilité de négocier à Bruxelles...

Le chancelier Kiesinger s'est, en tout cas, estimé très satisfait de ces longs entretiens où il a pu avoir — après coup — une explication détaillée des raisons de la politique française au Proche-Orient. Cela dit, la France ne revendra pas aux Allemands fédéraux le pétrole des Arabes...

Les résultats concrets, du reste, sont assez minces : on créera une commission commune pour développer la coopération économique, industrielle et technologique entre les deux pays. Bonn sera donc en compétition avec Moscou... on désignera, en France comme en R.F.A., une personnalité chargée de coordonner les travaux de la commission interministérielle prévue par le traité de 1963 ; enfin, on élaborera une étude sur la situation politico-stratégique dans les années 70, vue sous l'angle de la sécurité européenne. Tout cela est bien maigre et de nature à masquer le vide habituel de ces déplacements spectaculaires. Une désillusion supplémentaire attendait M. Messmer : contraint aux économies, Bonn n'achèterait plus que 50 Transall au lieu des 100 prévus. Au reste cet avion est encore sur le papier, et il n'aura peut-être pas un meilleur sort que feu l'avion franco-britannique à géométrie variable... Et pourtant, M. Couve de Murville a souligné hier qu'il était possible de développer davantage la coopération économique et technologique franco-allemande...

De tout cela, une chose demeure claire : le Président de la République essaie toujours de détacher Bonn des Anglais et des Américains. Il cultive pour la R.F.A. une amitié qui voudrait être exclusive et il lui offre en bénéfice son soutien pour une réunification des plus hypothétiques. Pensez-vous, diront de nombreux Allemands, l'obtenir de Moscou ? Non, bien sûr. Le côté le plus positif de son intervention réside finalement dans ce soutien apporté à la politique de détente avec l'Est poursuivie par M. Brandt. Il reste évidemment beaucoup à faire.

Jean-Pierre CORNET

WASHINGTON POST
18 July 1967

Hostile Broadcasts By Soviets Irk India

By Warren Unna

Washington Post Foreign Service

NEW DELHI—The Indian government has issued a series of protests against unfriendly broadcasts by Radio Peace and Progress, whose transmitter is in Soviet Uzbekistan.

The protests were confirmed in Parliament the other day by Foreign Minister M. C. Chagla. The fact that such broadcasts originate in the Soviet Union, this country's long-time friend and donor of aid, has puzzled many Indians. India also has reminded the Russians of their "unfriendly" behavior when they start making complaints here about some of the "unfriendly" news articles and cartoons which appear in the Indian press.

But it came as a shock to India's cabinet ministers when they received a confidential memorandum from the government All-India Radio monitoring service reporting that the Soviet Union, in company with India's two border enemies, Pakistan and Communist China, had been trying to use their radio transmitters to influence the outcome of India's general elections last February.

Stations Are Named

Three Soviet stations were named: Radio Moscow, Radio Tashkent and the clandestine Radio Peace and Progress, which has been beaming out unfavorable news about India on its hour and a half afternoon program since last July.

Indian officials acknowledge that the Russians first started showing signs of thinking that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's government was becoming too "reactionary" the month before, following India's June 6, 1966 decision to devalue her rupee currency in accordance with recommendation by the World Bank.

The broadcasts mounted in frequency and vitriol with the approach of India's general elections. Mrs. Gandhi has been exempted from criticism

all along and during the elections she and Congress Party President Kumaraswami Kamaraj were referred to as "progressives."

Leaders Scored

But three other Congress Party leaders, Morarji Desai, S. K. Patil and C. B. Gupta, were excoriated for being "reactionaries." Now that Desai is both deputy prime minister and finance minister and a potential successor to Mrs. Gandhi, Radio Peace and Progress has dropped his name from its clandestine broadcasts.

But Patil, a former minister of railways defeated in the election, and Gupta, the powerful former chief minister and Congress Party boss of huge Uttar Pradesh State, are still prime targets.

During the pre-election period, Radio Peace and Progress, in an effort to indict the highly Hindu nationalist and conservative Jana Sangh Party, had U.S. Gen. William C. Westmoreland declaring: "If the Jana Sangh comes to power I would get an inexhaustible number of Indian soldiers."

The Soviet broadcasts these days, according to India's own monitoring station in the Simla Hill station, seem to emphasize India's internal unrest.

The United States and the West often are coupled with the criticism of India's reactionaries. Ambassador Chester Bowles, the Peace Corps and the Central Intelligence Agency get frequent mention.

One of the most embarrassing things for India in this thoroughly awkward situation is that Pakistan newspapers have been picking up some of the Russians' anti-Indian broadcasts and delightedly printing articles on what India's own friends are saying about her.

COMBAT, Paris

14 July 1967

L'idée de nation

Le 14 juillet est la fête de la France. A l'évolution des formes qu'a prises sa célébration on mesure à quel point sa signification s'est modifiée non pas tant depuis les années révolutionnaires que depuis que de nouvelles notions sont intervenues dans la vie de peuples et des Etats : la notion de solidarité internationale, celle de communauté, celle de blocs. Ce n'est pas à cela seulement que tient la perte de substance dont est victime la fête nationale, ce n'est pas seulement au fait que les hommes s'habituent à penser et à vivre en termes internationaux, c'est aussi au fait que des événements se sont succédés, des guerres sont passées, des drames particulièrement aigus ont secoué le monde depuis un quart de siècle qui ont distendu les liens que chaque citoyen noue avec sa nation et qui ont altéré le sens de l'appartenance à la communauté nationale.

Ce phénomène de notre temps est évidemment limité aux pays qui ont une histoire nationale de longue date, un capital important, une tradition spécifique. La France en est le plus parfait symbole. Parallèlement, l'idée de nation est apparue et s'est rapidement épanouie dans des pays nouveaux, elle y a pris un pouvoir tel qu'elle détermine aujourd'hui l'ensemble de la politique de la plupart des pays du tiers-monde. Ce mouvement inversé restera sans doute comme l'une des dominantes de l'histoire que nous vivons. La partie « jeune » du monde a pris le relais de la partie vieille dans les rapports avec l'idée de nation. Cela suffit seul à expliquer la fragilité des blocs que constituent entre eux des Etats récemment promus à l'indépendance, et la solidité des blocs formés par les Etats « historiques ». Dans le premier cas, la nation sort gagnante de l'opération, dans le second elle est perdante.

On peut s'élever contre cette évolution : on peut la déplorer pour des raisons morales, ou pour des motifs sentimentaux, mais on ne peut pas la contester : elle a en effet force de loi, et l'histoire évolue sur le nouveau rythme qu'elle crée. S'y opposer, c'est s'opposer non seulement à une évidence mais aussi refuser le progrès afférent à toute évolution historique. Un exemple : l'unification de l'Europe était inscrite dans ce schéma. Les six Etats qui l'ont menée à bien ont compris, souvent au prix de certains sacrifices, qu'elle était une nécessité, et aujourd'hui chacun des Six trouve des raisons de s'en féliciter.

Cette analyse succincte suffit à éclairer les dangers contenus dans la conception de l'histoire selon le général de Gaulle. Cette évolution que nous évoquons, il est de fait, en effet, que le chef de l'Etat, si elle ne lui passe pas inaperçue, se refuse en tout cas à en admettre le caractère contraignant. On le sent partagé entre le désir d'obéir à la réalité profonde du déclin de l'idée de nation dans nos sociétés occidentales, et la nostalgie impérieuse de perpétuer le passé glorieux de la nation et de continuer à fonder une politique sur la notion de souveraineté nationale. Ce partage le conduit à semer son action de hiatus perpétuels. Il explique le caractère irréaliste d'une politique peut-être audacieuse dans ses objectifs, mais éminemment anachronique dans ses fondements.

Philippe TESSON.

COMBAT, Paris

12 July 1967

Le voyage du général de Gaulle à Bonn s'inscrit dans le cadre des rencontres franco-allemandes prévues par le traité de solidarité conclu entre les deux Etats. C'est donc un voyage de routine, et en vérité seule l'explique la routine, car on voit mal dans le contexte actuel de la diplomatie gaulliste quelle raison impérieuse, quel motif délibéré pourrait conduire le Chef de l'Etat à rendre une visite au chancelier Kiesinger.

Il y a en effet dans ce voyage quelque chose d'anachronique et de vain. Les relations entre les deux pays ne sont pas actuellement si privilégiées que cette visite apparaisse utile. Et pour ce qui est de l'anachronisme, on le relève par référence à ce qui fut la grande époque de l'amitié entre le général de Gaulle et le chancelier Adenauer, relativement à ce qui sépare les deux pays aujourd'hui, relativement aussi aux préoccupations qui ont pris le pas dans l'esprit du général de Gaulle sur la nécessaire cohésion des politiques allemande et française.

Ce n'est pas tant d'ailleurs cette révision dans la hiérarchie des urgences que les Allemands reprochent au chef de l'Etat, encore qu'ils aient des raisons de s'étonner qu'on se montre réservé après avoir si facilement cédé au lyrisme.

Ce qu'on admet plus difficilement outre-Rhin, c'est l'isolement total dans lequel s'enfoncent la diplomatie gaulliste, c'est le silence dans lequel elle opère, c'est l'indifférence dans laquelle elle tient ses alliés, c'est le mépris qu'elle affiche à l'égard des politiques voisines et amies, c'est le trouble qu'elle sème dans le camp occidental, c'est finalement davantage ce qui appartient à l'esprit que ce qui relève de la lettre.

Certes, il faut nuancer l'observation. Bonn a des motifs de s'inquiéter de certaines orientations de la politique étrangère française, notamment pour ce qui concerne les rapports d'amitié que Paris tente de nouer avec Moscou. Bonn préférerait également que la France pratique une politique européenne plus souple. Mais l'essentiel n'est pas là. L'essentiel est dans la solitude française qui apparaît de plus en plus préjudiciable non seulement à la France mais à ses alliés, et en particulier à l'Europe.

En s'abstenant de consulter ses partenaires européens à propos de toutes les initiatives qu'il prend, le général de Gaulle en vient à diminuer considérablement la voix de l'Europe, sans pour autant en tirer un bénéfice à la mesure de ses ambitions.

Que chacun des Etats de l'Europe occidentale conçoive et mène sa politique étrangère comme il l'entend, cela se justifie. Il est cependant certains grands chapitres de cette politique qui intéressent au premier chef l'ensemble de ces Etats — nous pensons notamment à la sécurité européenne. Jouer les cavaliers seuls, c'est manquer aux plus élémentaires procédures que commandent les alliances, et c'est délibérément brouiller les cartes.

COMBAT.

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August 1967

A Selective Bibliography of Material on
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August 1967

Communists Charge Others With Committing War Crimes

To Divert Attention From Their Own Guilt

For over a quarter of a century the Communists have charged other countries or groups -- notably those who happened at the time to be opposed to the foreign policy aims of the Communists -- with committing war crimes or crimes against humanity. Invariably, at the same time the Communists themselves were committing crimes of equal or greater gravity threatening vast groups of humanity.

On 27 November 1941 Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov sent a note to all governments with which the USSR had diplomatic relations calling their attention to the "systematic brutalities and atrocities inflicted by the German Government on Red Army men and commanders who are prisoners of war ... exposing the German military authorities and the German Government as a gang of cut-throats who ignore all principles of international law and human morality." Subsequent Soviet statements called attention to crimes against the civilian population in German-occupied territories, where laborers were deported to Germany to support the war machine.

The Nazis were certainly guilty of such crimes -- but what about the Soviet slaughter of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest and the forcible deportation of East German workers and their families to the USSR the same week that the Nazi leaders were hanged for the crimes for which they had been convicted at the Nuremberg Tribunal?

World War II provides many examples of how the Communists cynically used the subject of war crimes for their own propaganda purposes. The Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943 -- signed by the USSR, the United States, and the United Kingdom -- referred to "the major criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical localizations and who will be punished by the joint decision of the governments of the allies." These criminals, under the terms of the Moscow Declaration, would be tried by the laws and courts of liberated countries in which the crimes were committed. Typical of Communist utilization of membership on international bodies to glean sensitive information and then publicize it in their own propaganda was the case of Dr. B. Ecer, the Czechoslovak representative to the United Nations War Crimes Commission, who gave an unauthorized and controversial interview to the LONDON SUNDAY EXPRESS on 11 February 1945. Dr. Ecer selected those findings of the U.N. Commission, which had not been made public at the time, which conformed with the statements already made by Prof. Trainin, leading member of the Soviet Commission for the Investigation of German Crimes, statements regarded by world experts as the best expression of the Communist point of view on the subject.*

* Trainin's statements are contained in his book, The Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerites, published in Moscow in 1944.

Another typical tactic of the Communists when dealing with war crimes -- as well as with many other subjects of international concern -- is to insure that by their membership on world bodies they can control the exposure of information which might prove embarrassing to them. In January 1946 the non-Communist press reported the existence of a document allegedly written by the son of Japanese war criminal Konoye disclosing details of a Japanese-Russian agreement to divide up Asia between them. In order to prevent the disclosure of this document or of any other evidence concerning the Matsuoka mission to Moscow in 1941 and the resulting Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, material which might implicate the Communists in prior agreement with the "wrong" side, the Soviets insisted that their prosecutor or his deputy be present at all war crime trial sessions.

All this, of course, is past history, but similar tactics were followed by the Communists during the Korean war and continue today. For example, in his speech at the U.N. General Assembly on 19 June 1967 Soviet Premier Kosygin charged the Israelis with committing "atrocities and violence" in the Arab territories they had seized. By charging Israel with war crimes and aggression,* many observers felt Kosygin was trying to draw attention away from the Communists' current problems with the Arabs who were questioning the inadequate support and faulty equipment which the Soviets had supplied them.

But there is no question about one kind of equipment which the Communists are supplying to one Arab country to commit war crimes against another Arab country: On 2 June 1967 the International Committee of the Red Cross issued a statement in Geneva confirming earlier reports of regular use of poison gas by United Arab Republic forces against Arab inhabitants of Yemen. Although a number of papers around the world expressed their revulsion at this war crime -- the JAPAN TIMES comment of 25 June 1967 on the USSR's supply of all kinds of arms to the Mideast was headlined "Lethal Soviet Weapon Tested in Battles Against Yemen" and an editorial in the SUNDAY NATION of Nairobi on the same date observed that "the gas bomb cannisters dropped from Egyptian planes bore markings in Russian" -- nevertheless Communist propagandists could console themselves with the fact that their work had not been in vain: in many countries of the Free World the story of the gas atrocities in Yemen went unreported while at the same time the press was repeating unfounded charges that poison gas had been used against Communist terrorists in Vietnam.

* Typical of the continual change in Communist foreign policy and accompanying war propaganda was the fact that in May 1948 the USSR was one of the first countries to recognize the new state of Israel. When the Arab League subsequently invaded Israel the Soviet foreign policy journal, NEW TIMES, accused Britain and the United States of having helped the "organization of the aggression of Arab countries against the state of Israel."

Communist propagandists have recently been escalating their charges that the United States, South Vietnam, South Korea, and other Free World nations are committing war crimes in Vietnam. One of the most vicious statements in recent times was heard on a 15 June 1967 program by "Radio Peace and Progress" -- a broadcast service purporting to be the mouthpiece of private organizations in the USSR but transmitted over the facilities of the official Moscow radio. This broadcast charged that even Hitlerite SS "did not go quite so far in cynicism and hypocrisy" as the American troops who allegedly, among a long list of heinous crimes, "have locked old men in caves and then made use of toxic gas and grenades to destroy the caves and exterminate the people." (Such charges are also often carried by clandestine radios and other "unofficial" media controlled by the Communists; these outlets are used to spread irresponsible, inflammatory propaganda which the Communists do not want recognized by outraged audiences as emanating from official government media.)

The Communists, following their long-standing pattern, are levying wild charges against their adversaries in Vietnam to draw attention away from their own crimes. One method which they have used there and elsewhere since World War II is to launch terrorist attacks with a few "activists" from a local area who have been either trained in advance in a Communist country or directed on the spot by Communist "advisers." Such criminal activities are then lauded by foreign Communist and Communist-sympathizing media as representing the "patriotic endeavors" of "the people" against local "capitalist oppressors" or foreign "capitalist exploiters." Any subsequent sanctions imposed on the terrorists are then denounced by the worldwide Communist propaganda mill as "acts of cruel and tyrannical oppression."

The terrorism of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam is an outstanding example of a perfected technique; the SAIGON POST reported on 6 May 1967 that "Viet Cong guerrilla atrocities have increased by 50 percent in the past 12 months" and that "murder, torture, intimidation, and blackmail -- known euphemistically by the Viet Cong as 'armed propaganda' -- are used to eliminate opposition." North Vietnam's persistent refusal to let prisoners be seen by the Red Cross implies treatment that needs to be concealed. Recent photographs in the press substantiate the mistreatment.

Support for activities of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Communists is proclaimed by all Communist nations, including Cuba. The Havana radio on 8 July 1967, for example, reported that the Cuban Committee for Solidarity With Vietnam had held a seminar to discuss a document issued by the Tricontinental Committee in Support of Vietnam. The document reportedly "urges the maximum denunciation and condemnation of the war crimes perpetrated in North and South Vietnam by the North American imperialists." The Cuban radio was obviously trying to call

attention away from the many reports in the radio and press of the Western Hemisphere concerning Venezuelan charges lodged in the Organization of American States on the landing of Cuban-led guerrillas in Venezuela, also on evidence that Cuba is blatantly engaging in criminal activities that endanger the security of the entire continent. Conditions in Cuban prisons also require independent investigation.

When the United Nations General Assembly meets in the fall of 1967 it will study the "Question of the non-applicability of statutory limitation to war crimes and crimes against humanity" -- an issue pressed by Poland and the USSR. (The draft document on the issue concerns mainly Germany.) The following reminder by the editors of the SWISS PRESS REVIEW AND NEWS REPORT in Zurich might be considered by the U.N. delegates at this time; a short item in the 8 June 1967 issue entitled "Crimes of Which People No Longer Speak" states:

"There was a time, not so long ago, when it was considered the duty of the press to stigmatize crimes committed by Communist regimes. Times have changed; they are now barely treated as miscellaneous tid-bits. Such at least is the space currently given in the press to a report that a young man about 30, no longer able to stand the life in East Germany, tried to flee to West Berlin. He took a chance, but was felled by the bullets of the Volkspolizei only three meters from West Berlin while running toward Sandkrug Bridge, one of the crossing points of the Berlin Wall."

In regard to Germany, another embarrassing issue is the point raised by M. Wiesenthal, director of the Center for Documentation of the League of Jewish Victims, who held a press conference in Vienna to discuss the role being played by Nazi war criminals in Egypt today. LE MONDE of Paris on 9 June 1967 concluded its report on this press conference:

"All the revelations which M. Wiesenthal presented as duly established facts ... will perhaps be embarrassing for the Egyptians but even more so for the regimes of East Europe, which the speaker frankly reproached for showing an astonishing partiality in this respect. While the German Federal Republic on several occasions has sent requests for the extradition of war criminals to the governments of Egypt and Syria -- all rejected, moreover -- no similar request has ever been received by these same governments from a single Communist country."

There seems to be little respect for the principle mentioned by Professor of International Law Korovin in the 4 April 1945 of the Soviet Government paper IZVESTIYA; Korovin stated that the USSR had "clearly warned governments of neutral countries that it would regard furnishing of asylum, aid, or encouragement to war criminals as a violation of the principles for which the United Nations is fighting."

So far this paper has been limited to references to Communist countries which are members of the United Nations and mainly to war crimes. How about the major Communist country not a U.N. member, China, and how about mistreatment of humanity in peace time? The Communists themselves recently cited a very telling example: According to the 15 July 1967 issue of the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Soviet sources have revealed that the Chinese Communists are exporting opiates from Yunnan Province to Thailand where they are "refined into heroin and morphine and distributed abroad by underground dealers via Calcutta, Bombay, Athens, and Genoa." These secret narcotic exports, estimated to run between \$250 and \$350 million dollars a year, are said to be part of a Chinese Communist plan to reduce international resistance to their policies -- in fact, if not legally, a crime against humanity.

The above listing, far from complete, provides several typical instances of Communist war crime guilt over the years. Despite the pious references in Communist propaganda to the need to respect the Nuremberg, Hague, Geneva, and other international tribunals and conventions, it is the Communists themselves who over the years have been most guilty of terrorism against unarmed civilians, of murders and assassinations, of torture and other atrocities, of mistreatment and summary execution of prisoners -- in short, of all the crimes which they ascribe to whatever opponent their foreign policy selects at any one time.

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Excerpts from news items from 13 February-14 June 1967:

In late June 1967 Burma became the ninth country since February to have its embassy in Peking surrounded by howling Chinese mobs and its officialdom and citizenry assaulted by torrents of Chinese abuse. The immediate cause of these most recent excesses was the Burmese government's ban on the wearing of Mao Tse-tung lapel buttons by Chinese students in Rangoon. The buttons had been handed out to the Chinese students by Chinese Communist embassy officials over the protests of the usually cautiously proper Burmese officials. The ensuing row between Burmese and Chinese students at two schools spread to other schools and to the city at large resulting in demonstrations, rioting, car burnings, beatings and finally pitched battles which left dead and wounded strewn on Rangoon's streets and Chinese quarter (see news clips for details).

Note: A Chinese note to the Indonesian government which was made public on 16 June stated that "the Chinese government constantly protects the security of the representative organs and officials of all countries stationed in China".

USSR: The Soviet Embassy in Peking was in a state of siege from 26 January to 13 February during which time crowds prevented Soviet officials from entering or leaving the embassy compound. For a time, the embassy staff was forced to depend upon other diplomatic missions in Peking for food itself.

INDONESIA: On 29 April two Indonesian diplomats were manhandled by Red Guards at the Peking airport. On their arrival in Canton they were subjected to more than 12 hours of maltreatment and humiliation before finally being permitted to cross the border into Hong Kong.

BRITAIN: In May, Chinese Communist-inspired disturbances broke out in Hong Kong with the result that the British missions in Peking and Shanghai were the object of a three day attack. At Shanghai the British representative's home was ransacked after he had refused to bow to Mao Tse-tung's picture as the mob demanded. Later, when the British representative and his family left for Peking, he and an embassy colleague were struck, kicked and finally daubed with glue by Red Guards.

When war broke out in the Middle East a renewal of violence against British officials broke out in Peking. On 7 June, after demonstrators had been active outside the mission all day, a crowd forced its way into the British mission, assaulted officials and damaged property extensively. Two days later all the mission's windows were smashed, several more diplomats were attacked and an official car was set on fire.

cont.

MONGOLIA: In May, following the expulsion of three Chinese school-teachers from Mongolia, there was a Red Guard demonstration outside the Mongolian embassy in Peking. The Mongolian embassy had also been a target of Red Guard abuse in February because of Mongolia's close ties with the USSR. The demonstrations lasted three days.

U.S.: On 19 June Red Guard demonstrators in Peking set up a life-sized tableau in the gateway of the British mission. Featured were clay figures of U.S. President Johnson and the British Prime Minister being attached by a rope to a dog who was supposed to represent Israel's General Dayan (complete with eye patch).

INDIA: On 14 June a 1,000-strong mob of Red Guards manhandled and for one hour beat up two Indian diplomats at Peking airport. A member of the Protocol Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry was identified among the ringleaders of the mob. The Indians were being expelled on alleged and unspecified charges of espionage and had been snatched from the protection of other diplomats despite a safe conduct guarantee.

In every case of official foreign government complaints about the violence shown to diplomats in Peking, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has replied to protests by saying that the action of the revolutionary masses is completely justified and has refused to accept almost every official complaint.

In the cases of Indonesia, the UK, the USSR, Mongolia and Burma the Chinese Foreign Ministry has reiterated her now famous five "crisis" demands which are leveled against the governments of the officials with whom the Red Guards have tangled. These demands are leveled against friend and foe indiscriminately as follows:

- a. Punish the culprits (regardless of the alleged crime or what originally caused it to be committed)
- b. Relief for the victims' (Chinese) families (with no indication that the CPR considered itself in any way responsible for the excesses of the "revolutionary masses" against other nations or their nationals)
- c. Public apology by the offending officials or government to the CPR (the CPR is, of course, never the offender)
- d. Guaranteed safety of Chinese Communist offices and personnel (with absolute refusal on part of the Chinese Foreign Ministry to accept almost every official complaint or to take responsibility for mob or Red Guard demonstrations or worse)

- e. "Fascist atrocities" against overseas Chinese must be ended
(the CPR must at least give lip service to Chinese overseas
since the government does not wish to bite the hand that
feeds it-with remittances)

Note: In all these instances, Peking has disregarded the fact that Chinese, regardless of citizenship, who live in a foreign country, are subject to the laws and authorities of that country.

THE ECONOMIST JULY 8, 1967

*China and Burma***The end of a lovely relationship**

China's war with the world erupted into conflicts with former friends on three continents last week. Kenya, whose relations with China have been cooling in recent years, was attacked for having expelled the Chinese chargé d'affaires in retaliation for a Chinese denunciation of its economics minister, Mr Tom Mboya. East Germany, which has joined China's blacklist along with other friends of Russia, was accused of "political murder" after four Chinese diplomats died in a car crash north of Berlin. And Burma, whose careful neutrality seemed to have won it a place in Peking's heart, was denounced most scathingly of all for having engineered "fascist anti-Chinese atrocities" during a week of rioting in Rangoon and Mandalay.

Burmese officials had been predicting privately that Burma would be the next target for Red Guard disruption. And sure enough, the riots began in a cultural revolutionary way with a protest by Chinese students against a ban on wearing Mao Tse-tung badges. Several Chinese schools were closed and tension rose until four days later, on June 26th, some 2,000 Burmese stormed a Chinese school. The riots were on. Violence spread as demonstrators raided Chinese homes, shops and embassy offices and set cars on fire. On June 28th, while the Chinese embassy was under siege, a Chinese engineer on an aid project in Burma was stabbed to death in the embassy grounds. General Ne Win imposed martial law on parts of Rangoon and all schools and universities were closed.

By the weekend Rangoon was quiet although the anti-Chinese riots had spread to Burma's second city, Mandalay. Rangoon's official English-language newspaper, the *Guardian*, estimated over a hundred injured; the New China News

Agency claimed more than 100 Chinese killed. On June 29th Ne Win's effigy was burnt in Peking and the Burmese embassy became the ninth foreign mission to be demonstrated against this year.

On Tuesday, Burma's government radio declared that the Chinese communist students who had set off the rioting had been specially trained for the job in Peking. The *People's Daily* insisted that it had all been deliberately organised by the Burmese government. Neither explanation is likely to be true. But both governments share responsibility for the outbursts: the Chinese, for having infected their nationals everywhere with cultural revolutionary xenophobia; the Burmese, for having allowed the sino-phobia that is always latent in Burma to get out of hand.

The conflict may not have been intended by either side. But one thing is certain: the beautiful relationship between "paukphaws" or kinsmen is no more. The friendship was based on an understanding reached in the sunny days of the Bandung spirit. Burma would maintain its "positive neutrality" and China would not interfere in any of the three sensitive areas where Burma saw its national security at stake: the 1,000-mile boundary which had been demarcated by treaty in 1960; the two illegal Burmese communist parties, one of which is pro-Peking; and the local Chinese minority of about half a million.

The Chinese may have felt Burma's neutrality to be wavering when General Ne Win visited Washington last year; they must also have resented his nationalisation drive which took over the Bank of China and many local Chinese enterprises. But none of this surfaced in Sino-Burmese exchanges. Even last week's riots could have been written off if the Chinese still valued their ties with neutrals. But in their current mood, it seems that they do not. The *People's Daily* threw in its best invective in accusing Burma's "reactionary" government of collusion with the Russians and Americans. And the unkindest cut of all was when the Chinese broke their self-imposed ban and openly incited the local pro-Peking communists to a people's liberation war.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 July 1967

Neighbors balk at Peking

By John Hughes
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Hong Kong

Beyond the high, red walls of Chungnanhai, the closely guarded compound adjoining Peking's forbidden city where Communist China's leaders live and work, critical decisions are now confronting the creators of the so-called "cultural revolution."

As an export, the revolution has proved a flop. Now, even at home, the market for it may be about glutted.

All around the rim of China, neighbors both Communist and non-Communist have served notice that they intend to contain this final frenzied adventure of Mao Tse-tung within China's own borders.

The Soviet Union and Mongolia want no part of it. India, once the gentle pacifist, now fights like a tiger to keep it at bay. Burma, which once tip-toed away into the world of neutralism rather than offend Peking, is suddenly standing up to the Chinese and warning it will tolerate no Red Guard delinquency.

Hong Kong stiffening

Even Hong Kong, the tiny British colony, which has long tolerated everybody provided they made money and not trouble, now is getting tough. Tired of battling local Communists in the streets, police and troops are smashing their way into Communist union headquarters and rooting out the organizers.

In a pitched battle early Friday police stormed one fiercely defended dockworkers' union, bombarding it with tear gas and gunfire as the Communists fought back with acid, explosives, and fire bombs.

As police burned their way with acetylene torches through steel gates, the resisting Communists poured acid over them from above and fought a diehard battle throughout the building. One Communist was killed, a dozen injured, and 81 arrested in the three-hour battle.

Even in North Vietnam, the Communist leadership has made it clear that the methods of the cultural revolution are not for them.

'Deification' rejected

In a recent issue of the North Vietnamese party's theoretical journal, Hoc Tap, readers were pointedly reminded:

"We respect and love our leader but we do not deify him. Deification of a leader will lower the position of the masses of the people and even the leader himself." There followed barely veiled criticism of Maoist and Red Guard tactics.

Meanwhile, at home in China there appears to be mounting pressure to bring the cultural revolution to an end, albeit amid trumpetings of victory on the grounds that it has achieved its objective.

THE ECONOMIST JULY 8, 1967

Hongkong

How-why failure

FROM OUR HONGKONG CORRESPONDENT

Hongkong's *amahs*, cookboys and housewives, who have been suffering the difficult hold-down on water and food supplies and the build-up of prices at the markets, do not use the word "communist." They call those responsible *how-why*, which is Cantonese for "very bad." They know that the *how-why* men are communists but ideological error is not as reprehensible as anti-social offence. So Hongkong's apolitical community has passed its severest judgment on party agitators.

There has been a splendid display of masochism in this week's frustrated campaign of strikes, bribery and intimidation. Communist stores closed their doors for four days, hurting no one more than themselves and their comrade exporters on the mainland. Supplies of livestock, pigs and vegetables from China were returned to Kwangtung province because good honest party men in Hongkong had been directed not to unload the freight. As a result the price of pork and vegetables rose sharply and eggs were hardly to be found although farmers in the New Territories rushed in emergency supplies. But the consumers who suffered most were the very people in Hongkong whom the *how-why* boys are presumably trying to win over.

Apparently Peking has decided to refuse the Hongkong government's requests for 2,000 million gallons of water above the contracted volume which has already been supplied. The pumps from Canton's East River have been turned off, but the colony has been long accustomed to drought and the resultant retreat to

a four-hour ration every two days is not an unfamiliar hardship. Once again, however, it is the proletariat who are suffering at the hands of their "liberators" and every Chinese housewife who has to treasure her water knows who is to blame.

Singapore and Manila have been quick to leap in with claims that Hongkong "hot money" is fleeing the colony to their safer sanctuaries, but the reports are extravagantly exaggerated. About £12 million has been withdrawn from the colony's banks in the last two months, that is, less than two per cent of the money in Hongkong. Peking itself may be suffering more than Hongkong. The squeeze on fraternal firms and banks in the colony to help the "anti-persecution" campaign represents diversion of funds which normally would have been going to China or operating for China in the colony. Communist-controlled banks have been hit by withdrawals following reports, right or wrong, that depositors are expected to donate cash to the struggle. So have the communist stores, which were popularly believed to be appropriating customers' change for the same cause. The *Hongkong Times* estimates that China lost £30 million in trade over the last two months.

None of this commotion helps Hongkong. The long range effect of the disturbances on the "hot money" investment which keeps Hongkong's life blood flowing cannot be predicted. Macao's capitulation has not helped—except in so far as the price of appeasement there has been recognised in Hongkong as defeat and surrender. Now it is up to the Hongkong government to push through countermeasures. This means more punch for the labour department so that it can anticipate and settle labour disputes, and more money for social welfare and education — to outpace the frustrated aggression by the *how-why* boys.

WASHINGTON POST

4 July 1967

China Seen Pressing For Revolt in Burma

By Stanley Karnow
Washington Post Staff Writer

HONG KONG, July 4—Red China appears to be encouraging Burma's Communist insurgents to accelerate their efforts to overthrow Prime Minister Ne Win's government.

In a series of recent statements, Peking has switched radically from its past position of support for the Burmese government's "policy of peace and neutrality" to outright exhortations urging the Communists to step up their rebellion against the present regime.

An official People's Daily editorial last week, for example, asserted that the "revolutionary armed struggle led by the Burmese Communist Party" is expanding and growing stronger.

Peking also publicized a statement this past weekend, purportedly issued by the Burmese Communist Party's Central Committee, accusing Ne Win's military government of perpetuating a "reign of terror" and "trying to fool the people with its phony 'socialist program.'"

Riot Provocation Seen

The Burmese Communist document, which bears the earmarks of Chinese authorship, claimed that Ne Win's regime is "gasping for breath . . . before the accumulating wrath of the entire nation."

This new tactic by Peking suggests to analysts here that Chinese diplomats in Rangoon could have deliberately provoked last week's riots in the Burmese capital in order to provide China with a pretext to abandon its formerly cordial relations with Burma.

[The rioting has provoked counterdemonstrations in Peking. Reuters reported from Hong Kong that more than 100,000 Chinese staged another massive demonstration Monday in front of the Burmese Embassy in Peking, according to Peking radio.]

Moves by Ne Win

The latest Chinese diplomatic maneuver, these analysts believe, may have been prompted by Peking's increasing irritation with signs that Ne Win has been seeking to adopt

These signs include Ne Win's foreign tour last year, which featured his first official visit to the United States, and his moves to remove some of the controls he imposed on Burma's economy. The Burmese Prime Minister has also shifted toward closer links with the Soviet Union, Peking's arch-enemy.

The steady deterioration of the Burmese economy—the latest rice crop was reportedly the country's lowest in history—may have persuaded Peking that Burma is approaching a revolutionary situation that needs only to be ignited.

Judging from their propaganda, the Burmese Communists are trying to unify the different religious, political and ethnic insurgent groups that have been fighting the Rangoon government since 1948.

Among these groups are the Karens, Kachins, Shans and Arakanese, each operating in different parts of the country. Some are split into rival splinters, making them little more than unruly bandit gangs.

Originally an offshoot of the Indian Communist Party, the Burmese Reds first went into opposition in 1948, soon breaking into two factions. The larger, orthodox group called itself the Burmese Communist Party, or "White Flags," while the smaller band was known as the Communist Party of Burma, or "Red Flags."

Neither received much sympathy from Peking. In 1951, the Chinese criticized the orthodox Burmese Communists for their "ultra-left" line, and suggested they make peace with the Burmese government, then headed by Prime Minister U Nu.

Chinese attempts to mediate the Burmese Communist insurgency continued until 1963, when 30 "White Flag" leaders living in Peking were flown to Rangoon to negotiate a peace. The talks failed, and two of

Peking, while the 28 others fled into the jungle.

After that, the Chinese took a more equivocal line. Late in 1964 they endorsed the Rangoon government's policy of "peace and neutrality," counterpointing that phrase with praise for the Burmese Communist effort to create "a new Burma of real independence."

Peking's ambiguity has now changed to open backing for the Communists against Ne Win's "fascist reactionary" government which, the Chinese say, has all along been "tailing behind U.S. imperialism and Soviet modern revisionism."

The Chinese can fortify the Burmese Communists by shipping weapons across the border from Yunnan Province, through a region of tangled mountain jungle difficult to patrol. The Burmese Army, which numbers 100,000 men, is already stretched thin in policing the country's various rebel regions.

But Burma's Communists, whose estimated strength is less than 20,000, are far from a disciplined guerrilla organization. They appear to devote more energy to pure terrorism than to building up a solid political base.

The government-supervised Rangoon press obliquely blamed Peking yesterday for stimulating Burmese Communist violence. The government itself, however, has so far refrained from officially implicating the Chinese in the insurgency—a hint that Ne Win may still hope to repair Burma's tattered ties with its powerful neighbor to the north.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 June 1967

China Files Protest

By THILMAN DURDIN

Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, June 28—Communist China filed a strong protest with the Burmese Government today over clashes between Chinese and Burmese in Rangoon.

The protest charged the Burmese Government with instigating and conniving in attacks by Burmese rioters on the Communist-Chinese Embassy, other Chinese agencies in Rangoon and Chinese nationals in general. China demanded that Burma take immediate steps to prevent aggravation of the situation, guarantee the safety of Chinese and punish those responsible for the incidents.

The protest warned Burma that, if she continued a policy of "frantically opposing China and persecuting overseas Chinese, she would have to bear 'full responsibility for all the serious consequences arising therefrom.'"

The protest was relayed here tonight by Hsinking, the Chinese Communist press agency. It was handed today to Sama Dua Sinwa Nawng the Burmese Ambassador in Peking, by Han Nien-lung, Chinese deputy Foreign Minister.

The two Governments have dealt with each other on an aloof, but workable, basis for years.

New Dispute for China

With the addition of Burma to the list, Communist China is at odds with every non-Communist territory on her borders except Pakistan and Afghanistan. Of the four Communist states that have common frontiers with China, Peking is at odds with two—the Soviet Union and Mongolia—views North Korea with ill-concealed disapproval and gets along only with North Vietnam.

Since he came to power in 1962 with his totalitarian Socialist regime, General Ne Win, mindful of Burma's weakness and thousand-mile border with China, has made a strong effort to get along with Communist China. He settled a border dispute with Peking and accepted Chinese aid for some construction projects.

In recent years their relations have cooled. Indications of surreptitious Chinese relations with the Burmese Communist party have not pleased General Ne Win. The party recently sent congratulations to Peking on the explosion of a hydrogen bomb by Chinese Communist scientists.

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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

August 1967

Soviet Weapons and Military Training for Developing Countries

The recent Near Eastern crisis has revived and intensified interest in the Kremlin's 11 ½-year old program on military aid: its motivations, background, and results. Because of Soviet-imposed secrecy, however, relatively little information -- but much conjecture -- was immediately available. The following discussion touches on the above-noted aspects of military aid.

Motivations: The Soviets have recently confirmed the most extreme foreign conjectures about their military aid program by publishing what adds up to a blueprint for total take-over of the UAR.* The first step is to eliminate the officer class which, according to the Soviets, is opposed to "the revolution" (which the officers themselves started in July 1952) and committed treason in the war against the Israelis. Other implicit steps to follow are:

- a) to ensure that "the people [definition: workers and peasants; in practice, Leninist cadres] and only the people play the guiding role in the life of the state;"
- b) to carry out a "general reorganization" (i.e., purge) of the armed forces;
- c) to bring the "national liberation revolution" to a victorious conclusion by breaking up "the old state machine" and also reorganizing the Arab Socialist Union;
- d) to socialize the country by seeing that "the people's...services will be used in everything, beginning with managing the economy of a small village to planning on a national scale;"
- e) to ensure that the UAR's young people will be "much more widely used in matters useful for the revolution" and will be "organized in the right way and be guided toward necessary tasks;"
- f) through friendship and cooperation with the USSR, to make Egypt an example that "will widely influence the entire development of the so-called 'third world' in the future."

*See the attached full translation of an article filed in Cairo by Soviet correspondents. Belyakov and Ye. Primakov and published in ZA RUBEZHOM (Life Abroad)

(Cont.)

The motivations behind the Kremlin's long and expensive program for arms and economic aid for the UAR and other developing countries, thus, are clear: to deepen a country's reliance on the USSR to the point of dependence, and to extract the maximum price for the continuation of such aid.

Background: In contrast to the clarity of the aims underlying the Kremlin's military aid program is the fuzziness of the dimensions and particulars of program. Few commentators possess balanced sources of information. Nonetheless, an assortment of studies treating aspects of the program, (see references) and newspaper and magazine accounts provide a reasonable picture of the situation.

a) amount

Between 1955 and mid-1967 the USSR had rendered military aid to the developing countries in the amount of between \$5 and \$7.5 billion.

b) geographic concentration

Well over half of Soviet military aid has been sent to the Near East (UAR, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Yemen) with the UAR receiving more than half of this amount. Indonesia received very generous amounts of military aid, mostly in the early 1960's but none since the fall of Sukarno. India is a prominent recipient of Soviet military aid and Afghanistan, probably because it borders the USSR, received a relatively large share.

c) kinds of military equipment

The USSR has shipped arms varying from obsolete to very modern, and embracing the whole range of hardware including planes, tanks, field artillery, antiaircraft artillery and rockets, small arms, and naval vessels. For the most part, shipments have been "from the shelf" or, in other words, what had been developed and produced for the Soviet armed forces and was immediately available. (See attached lists of Soviet arms sent to selected Near Eastern countries.)

d) training

Soviet aid in the training of the armed forces of developing countries has been rendered both in the USSR and in the country receiving aid. The training in the USSR usually takes place at Soviet military institutes and facilities; many thousands of middle-grade to senior officers from developing countries have received doctrinal and tactical training for periods ranging up

to several years. In the recipient countries Soviet military instructors function at a generally lower level: teaching the operation and maintenance of equipment; observing and instructing tactical operations. Soviet military instructors are observed in most developing countries to exceed economic advisors by a significant amount.

e) quality of equipment and training

Individual pieces of Soviet equipment are variously rated by foreigners; but in general, the quality itself is deemed adequate, though not superlative. Criticisms have been leveled more at the adaptability and complementary nature of some weapons and sets of weapons. Also criticized has been the doctrinal training provided by the USSR, especially as shown by the Arab-Israeli war. (See attached discussion of this subject.)

Results: In the basic pattern, the initial enthusiasm of most leaders of developing countries wanes when they discover what Soviet aid actually amounts to.* For one thing, the usefulness of the arms falls short of expectations: they are suited to Soviet requirements (or at least the Soviet requirements of ten years ago), but they do not coincide with local needs, either from the narrow military standpoint or from the standpoint of over-all national interests. They do not even afford stability to the regime in power, as was learned by past regimes in Syria, Iraq, and Indonesia. It is especially disillusioning when the Soviets present the bill; for then it becomes clear that, in spite of large discounts and grants, the arms have produced nothing of value, and are a burden to the country's development. Outstanding examples of the eventual outcome of massive Soviet military aid are Indonesia and the UAR, both of which are virtually bankrupt.

From the Kremlin's standpoint, substantial gains in its presence and influence -- both world-wide and in selected countries or areas -- have been achieved since 1955, in large measure because of its generosity in providing military aid. Whether top-level Soviet politicians can agree to be satisfied with limited gains remains to be seen.

The greatest attention currently and for some time to come will be paid to the military situation in the UAR. The questions will focus on

*Frequently discussions of Soviet arms deals are initiated by the developing countries, whose leaders are attracted by the widely disseminated information that the Soviets have arms to offer at low prices and favorable terms with "no strings attached."

the amount and timing of the re-supply of Soviet equipment and the kinds of UAR trainees to be selected and the training they will receive. The answers will depend in large part upon the political situation in both countries.

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NEW YORK TIMES

11 July 1967

CAIRO'S NEW ARMS STIR U.S. CONCERN

Size of Soviet Commitment Is Not Yet Determined

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 10 —

Reports and analysis of Soviet arms shipments to the United Arab Republic in the last month suggest that Egypt has made up some of the sizable losses of the six-day war against Israel but that the pace of the shipments has not yet disclosed the extent of Moscow's commitment.

The reports are serious enough to have aroused concern here about yet another serious arms race in the Middle East.

In the absence of any private sign that the Soviet leaders would agree with Western nations to limit arms sales to the Middle East, the Johnson Administration may soon try to apply public pressure.

President Johnson is reported to favor an early report to the United Nations about United States arms shipments, both to Israel and to some Arab countries, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. He would couple this report with a demand that other nations also disclose their sales. Mr. Johnson proposed such a public accounting in a speech on June 19.

Ships and Planes Involved

Since the start of the Middle Eastern war on June 5, at least a half-dozen Soviet ships and several dozen Soviet transport planes have carried more than 25,000 tons of military equipment to Egypt. One of two of these ships were probably loaded before the outbreak of fighting.

In addition, about 5,000 tons in several ships have been sent to Syria and nearly as much in several other ships to Algeria, which has funneled some of the equipment to Egypt.

The full range of the materiel supplied has been difficult to determine, but reports reaching Washington suggest the following:

The Egyptians lost 100 of their 163 Delta-wing MIG-21 fighters, the most sophisticated plane furnished to any nation

by the Soviet Union. In the last month they have received about 10 new ones from the Soviet Union and 20 more from Algeria.

They lost about 30 of their 40 MIG-19's, the earlier-model Soviet supersonic fighter. None of these appears to have been replaced so far.

Older MIG's Replaced

The new planes have replaced older MIG-15 and MIG-17 jet fighters. Egypt lost about 95 of the 100 she had at the start of the war. She has received about 50 replacements directly from the Soviet Union and 20 from Algeria.

Information on three other types of modern attack planes has been more sketchy. The Egyptians lost 14 of their 55 Sukhoi-7 fighter-bombers but appear to have received no new ones. They lost about 30 of 43 Ilyushin-28 light bombers and have received perhaps a dozen new ones from Algeria.

They lost all 25 of their Tupolev-16 bombers—the equivalent of the large Soviet jet passenger planes—with no evident replacements so far.

Most of the ships bearing arms to Egypt have brought equipment for ground troops, but the inventories have not been easy to determine.

The Soviet supply ships do not include the dozen or so naval vessels now planning to show the Soviet flag in several Arab ports. Officials here consider the Soviet announcement of these naval visits to be an effort to demonstrate Moscow's support for the Arab cause and to overcome resentment at the Soviet failure to intervene with the relatively new role of a world-wide sea power.

Egypt Lost 500 Tanks

The Egyptians lost at least 500 of their 1,000 Stalin-3 heavy tanks and have received slightly more than 100 new ones.

They have received about 100 guns and artillery pieces to offset undetermined losses of their original stock of more than 3,000.

They have received only a handful of personnel carriers to offset undisclosed losses in an arsenal of about 900 and have received nearly 300 wheeled vehicles to offset losses in an original inventory of 23,000.

Officials here have not divulged what shipments of arms the United States is considering for the Middle East.

King Hussein of Jordan requested replacement for most of his heavy losses of aircraft,

tanks, guns and vehicles to the Israelis. The Israelis have applied to the United States for fighter-bombers to replace the 40 French craft they lost from an original supply of several hundred, and will probably seek additional help.

The full range of American arms shipments to the Middle East, together with a policy statement for future sales, may be prepared for the United Nations disclosure favored by the President.

In the past, sales to both Israel and some Arab nations have been explained as an effort to preserve a balance of power against Egypt and other Soviet-supplied nations.

By "balance," officials here have always meant enough arms for Israel from all available sources to enable her to defend herself against all Arab challengers without the need for direct United States intervention in any war.

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August 1967

FLAWS IN SOVIET MILITARY DECISION-MAKING DISCUSSED

Lt. General M. Ivanov, Chief of Staff of the Baltic Military District, provides considerable insight into a weakness in Soviet tactics in his long article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) of July 5, 1967. General Ivanov focuses on the time factor in battlefield decision-making, and takes for his example the tactical maneuvers of a tank company whose orders from higher echelon were slow and did not take full account of the terrain features. The net effect of these defects was probably very high losses, attributable mainly to the failure to perceive the opportunity to surprise the "enemy" by going around on the non-swampy side of the hill and attacking from the flank or the rear.

The general places these observations in the context of "the revolution which is taking place in military affairs." He asserted that the "classical" Soviet routine for working out decisions was justified in World War II, but implied that modern warfare won't permit the luxury of long, drawn-out decision-making.

General Ivanov came close, at times, to describing conditions reported to be in effect during the Arab-Israeli War. One can only speculate, in this connection, on how thoroughly the Soviets grounded the Arab officers in such outmoded techniques as were uncovered in their recent observations of their own tank forces. It will be recalled that one of the major advantages of the Israeli army stemmed from its ability to quickly size up the situation and seize the offensive initiative. How often would a UAR field commander be defeated because his decisions and orders, following Soviet practices, took too much time?

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August 1967

Cuba's Economic Woes

Castro's current offensive in Latin America, based almost entirely on armed violence by small bands of desperate men seeking to impose themselves on the country by main force, makes little propaganda about the Communist utopia which is supposedly its ultimate purpose. Surely this is due in large part to Cuba's inability to stand as a happy example, a "showcase of Communism" as they used to call it. In fact, Cuba is an economic mess, unable to show any improvement in its standard of living, every year more indebted to the Soviet Union, incessantly obliged to impose more strict controls over its populace in hopes of reversing the tide.

The Cuban economy has essentially passed through three phases since Castro's accession to power in January 1959. The first continued the pre-revolutionary growth of the economy at a rate of roughly 3 percent per annum. This phase lasted through 1959, 1960, and into 1961. However, toward the middle of 1961 the economy entered the second phase, that of an abrupt decline which lasted through mid-1963. The third phase, one of slow recovery, has lasted from then to the present.

The pattern thus established is not difficult to trace to its origins. When Castro came to power, he held grandiose ideas of industrializing the Cuban island, in the manner of Stalin's forced-draft industrialization of the Soviet Union. He looked on sugar, the overwhelmingly important element in the economy up to that point, as an "imperialist crop" to be replaced by diversified agriculture and especially by a modern industry. Unfortunately for the Cuban people his program proved as impractical as the guerrilla soldiers who -- as government ministers -- tried to carry it out.

Castro had the world's best sugar land plowed for other crops. Cattle and dairy herds were slaughtered for food, while plans were made for building new industries using raw materials that had to be purchased abroad and processed with machinery that also had to be purchased abroad. The economy survived on momentum for a period, but by 1963 it was evident that planned industrialization was a staggering failure. At the same time, Castro's raving against sugar production took effect and production dropped from a pre-Castro average of nearly 6 million tons to 4.8 million in 1962 and 3.8 in 1963.

The overriding importance of sugar for the Cuban economy stems from the simple fact that about 85 percent of Cuba's foreign trade comes from the sale of sugar. And foreign exchange is essential since the country produces so little else and must buy all of its major supplies abroad, from raw materials to basic consumer goods.

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The problem was compounded by a drop in the price of sugar on the world market. From 1959 to 1962 sugar averaged about 3 cents per pound; in 1963 it went up to 8.3 cents, in 1964 to 5.7 cents and fell off sharply thereafter to a current low of about 2.02 cents. Thus Castro needs to sell more sugar than ever to earn a dollar of hard currency.

After the disaster of the 1963 sugar crop, Castro succumbed to necessity and to the dictates of the Soviet Union and set out to rebuild Cuban sugar production as the mainstay of the economy. He announced a five year "sugar perspective plan" to increase production from 6 million tons in 1965 to 10 million tons in 1970. The 1965 quota of 6 million has been the only one successfully met. In 1966 the quota was 6.5 million and production was 4.5 million; in 1967 the quota was 7.5 million and production was 6.1 million. The plan calls for 8 million in 1968 and 9 million in 1969. The possibilities for attaining these goals are nil.

Sugar was not the only crop which suffered severe setbacks. Rice production, which in the 1950's had been increased from 200,000 to 300,000 tons annually, so that the domestic demand could be covered and even a small surplus exported, was neglected to such an extent that in 1965 the harvest amounted to only 48,000 tons. Normal consumption of 10 pounds per person per month has been reduced to 3 pounds under strict rationing. The output of coffee dropped from 52,000 to 23,000 tons; this also is no longer enough to cover the domestic demand, while in the past Cuba used to export coffee. The Cuban regime has often explained its problems as due to a lack of experience. That the situation should be so pitiful after eight years of Castro's rule indicates a lamentable incapacity to learn.

Shortly after taking power Castro instituted an agrarian reform program which resulted in 70 percent of the land being taken over by the state. This land was not distributed to the peasants, but rather was organized into state farms -- or sovkhozes; there are now 509 of them, employing 243,000 workers and covering 5 million hectares of land. They have been no more successful than the Soviet farms; despite a large investment of state funds, they produce less than the same soil, in private hands, yielded before Castro's day. Private farms, on the other hand, comprising 30 percent of the arable land, produce 46 percent of the nation's cereals, 56 percent of its vegetables, 70 percent of its fruits, and up to 90 percent of its coffee, tea and tobacco (all according to the official LA PRENSA, 23 September 1966). Despite this impressive showing, Castro has made it clear that he intends gradually to eliminate the private farms by forcing the farmers to sell their land to the state. He is thus running contrary to the experience of other Communist nations, especially Poland and Yugoslavia, which have had to recognize the importance of private plots on state farms, and which are liberalizing the controls on private farms where they exist.

With the Communist regime of Fidel Castro came an enormous bureaucracy that appalls even the "maximum leader." He is not prepared to admit that the bureaucracy, irresponsible officialdom, inefficiency and lack of expertise are by-products of his ideological approach to management of the economy, but ascribes them to an "unpleasant residue" from capitalism. Nevertheless, Castro has found it necessary to launch concerted campaigns against the evils of bureaucracy. One major campaign was launched in January 1965, sparked by the creation of "Struggle Against Bureaucracy" committees. But on 19 December 1966 he had to admit that the committees themselves had become bureaucratized and described the campaign as "preaching in the wilderness, plowing the sea." Granma subsequently reported that nearly 10,000 of the 21,000 people kicked out of their jobs and placed in the labor reserve as a result of the committee's labors in the Havana area had already returned to the same or similar jobs. At the end of January of this year, 140 students from the Havana Party School formed special control committees to check on the anti-bureaucracy committees! In March the Camaguey party provincial committee ordered all the province's anti-bureaucracy committees dissolved because of bureaucratic inefficiency!

To compensate for the problems caused by poor planning and poor management, Castro has increasingly relied on various schemes to direct Cuban labor toward the crisis sectors, meaning, almost invariably, toward sugar production. At first he counted largely on exhortations to his followers to perform voluntary labor in the cane fields, believing that the excitement of self-sacrifice in the common cause could conquer any obstacle. Now he relies on more prosaic controls; for example, as of mid-May 1967 all members of the Union of Communist Youth were obliged to swear to do agricultural work for two years -- and a youth cannot aspire to important positions in the future without party membership. Old Guard Communist Party members were also reportedly being removed from their regular employment and sent to agricultural tasks under a plan known as "Cara al Campo" (Face to the Country). To boost the labor force for the 1967 harvest, the Ministry of Construction stopped all of its construction projects so that its labor force could be used in the sugar harvest. Technical students in Havana started for the cane fields on 1 February this year, a month earlier than expected, and worked until May or June. Having lost so much time from their studies, graduation has been put off until December. Fourteen thousand students, professors, and staff personnel of Havana University were drafted into agricultural work on 9 April for 45 days.

Additionally, most workers in Havana were put on a schedule of three weeks in the fields for one week in the city. The Armed Forces were called on to play an even more active role in the cane harvest this year than in the past. Since the soldiers receive only a few dollars a month in pay, this is practically free labor for the Cuban regime. Another 35,000, or more, laborers come from the so-called "Military Units for Aiding Production" (Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Produccion - UMAP),

which are battallions of men drafted into labor camps for indeterminate periods of time on grounds of allegedly being drug addicts, homosexuals, religious believers, thieves, or applicants for emigration. Paid only a pittance, they are in effect slave labor in a system patterned after the infamous Soviet "Corrective Labor" camps.

Castro's labor problem is further complicated by the continuing exodus of refugees leaving for more hospitable lands. By mid-1967 some 375,000 persons had left the Caribbean island, of whom approximately 325,000 found new homes in the United States. The flow continues at the rate of 3,500 every month. Although this exodus serves one of Castro's basic purposes, which is to avoid internal opposition by removing the dissenters, it also deprives the economy of large numbers of workers. For instance, so many merchant marine personnel have left that Castro is forced to hire Soviet captains and engineer officers to man Cuba's merchant fleet; only a handful of the top experts in sugar production remain; the departure of the top dozen could ruin the industry.

Rather than recognize, as have the Soviets and their other satellites, that increasing production depends in good part on giving material incentives to workers, Castro continues to insist on the virtues of "moral incentives," that is, the satisfaction of developing a "Communist consciousness." Examples of the results have regularly appeared in Granma; on April 8 it reported that an investigator discovered that on one farm a truck had been broken down for 45 days and a replacement had been hired at the cost of 40 pesos for every eight hours. Ten tractors, four other trucks and another vehicle were unusable, and 70 percent of the farm's mechanical equipment lacked starter motors. One tractor sent for repair in 1964 had been lost. As a result the farm manager was removed from his post -- but placed in a similar job at another farm.

The same fate seems to have befallen the Soviet cane-cutting and loading combines which had been hailed as the solution to the scarcity of farmhands. According to press reports from Havana most of the 1000 combines which were sent to Cuba are broken down, and no new ones are scheduled to be sent for the next harvest. They never worked satisfactorily, requiring absolutely flat land and performing poorly if the cane stalks have been blown down by wind, a frequent condition in Cuba. Moreover, they tend to pick up dirt, sticks and stones along with the cane and this foreign matter causes rapid wear of the grinding machinery in the sugar mills. They are rarely mentioned now in Cuban propaganda.

Cuba's economy has hardly fared better in international trade than it has at home. Castro was committed to export 4 million tons of sugar to the USSR this year and another 1.3 million tons to the rest of the Communist bloc, including China; a further 500,000 tons is required for domestic consumption. With a total production of 6.1 million, this leaves only 800,000 tons for sale on the world market. However Cuba had already sold in advance 1.8 million tons to Free world customers. Some of these countries have signed contracts to buy Cuban sugar exclusively, provided

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Cuba agrees to sell them all they require and Cuba cannot default on such customers. There are other customers who are so large that Cuba has assiduously sought their trade and, having got it, cannot afford to default. Although the USSR has in each of the past four years agreed to accept less than its quota, and did agree recently to accept only 3.5 million tons this year, this still forces Cuba to buy sugar to meet her commitments. (The USSR does not need all of the 3.5 million tons, but is using this method to remind Castro what hand holds the whip.)

The Soviet Union pays a support price for the sugar it buys from Cuba -- about 6 cents per pound versus 2 cents on the free market. However it in turn overcharges Cuba for the goods it sells in exchange. Even so, Cuba has a very unfavorable exchange balance with the Bloc. Cuba imports about half again as much from the Soviet Union as it exports to that country. As a consequence of Castro's policies, Cuba's trade links with the rest of the world have been seriously reduced and 80 percent of its trade is now with the Communist bloc, of which about half is with the Soviet Union. And its trade deficit leads it inexorably deeper into a neo-colonialist dependence on the Soviet Union.

How then can Cuba carry on if its domestic and international economic affairs are in such disarray? The answer is simple: Castro lives on a dole from the Communist bloc, more specifically from the Soviet Union. The aid is given in four major ways: balance of payments credits; economic development credits, sugar subsidies, and technical assistance. Altogether they total over \$350 million per annum -- a million dollars each day. From 1961 through 1966 Cuba is estimated to have received a total of \$2 billion in foreign aid. Aside from that given as sugar subsidies, most of this aid is supposed to be repaid, but repayment is highly unlikely because of Cuba's inability to generate a trade surplus.

Despite this considerable Soviet aid, Cuba has failed to achieve any significant growth. The islands gross national product last year, when the population stood at 7.8 million, was approximately that of 1957, when there were only 6.5 million inhabitants. (Cuba's apologists often speak of large annual increases in GNP; one even claimed 8% per annum. However these are increases measured in current prices, not in terms of real value; price inflation accounts for the illusory growth rate.)

The conclusion is obvious: Communism in Cuba has failed to better the economic life of its people; worse, it has brought the country to the status of a Soviet colony. As unsuccessful as it has been, it will continue to muddle along as long as the Soviet Union sees fit to support it -- a decision which will be made on political, not economic grounds.

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August 1967

"MAO'S THOUGHT" ON "PEOPLE'S WAR" APPLIED
ON A GLOBAL SCALE -- THE DESTRUCTIVE
AFTERMATH OF LIN PIAO'S DECLARATION

SUMMARY: Two years ago Peking media publicized a long tract on "people's war" attributed to Defense Minister Lin Piao, who has subsequently emerged as Mao's "closest comrade." This declaration is the authoritative Chinese "blueprint for world revolution," comparable to Hitler's MEIN KAMPF. Largely a synthesis of previous Mao statements glorifying armed warfare as "the highest form of revolution," it extended Mao's fundamental theory on "the encirclement of the city from the countryside" to the global scene, depicting the industrialized nations of the West as the "world rural areas." In other words, the Chinese, completely reversing the long-standing classical Communist concept of Communist revolution led by the industrial proletariat on an international as well as an internal level, now predict (and promise to work for) the achievement of a Communist world as a very long process in which the developing areas will gradually be taken over by guerrilla warfare and used as revolutionary bases until the industrial nations are finally "encircled," isolated, and brought under Communist domination.

The subsequent two years, however, have given little reason to accept this theory as valid. Quite the contrary, efforts to apply "Mao's thought" on "people's war" have generally produced a record of failure in the developing countries around the world, ranging from minor setbacks to major disasters with heavy losses, -- beginning with the Communist catastrophe in Indonesia which began less than a month after the Lin article appeared. This period has increased Chinese isolation and decreased Chinese influence throughout most of the world, except among a narrow fringe of the most extreme elements.

Meanwhile, in the relatively few countries where the Chinese have contented themselves with following the more "conventional" (Soviet-style) methods of Communist propaganda, infiltration, and subversion under the cover of diplomatic relations, aid and trade, they have in some cases apparently achieved some progress.

The lessons of these two years have not caused the Mao-Lin leadership to reconsider their emphasis on "people's war" and to re-shape Chinese foreign policies. Moreover, there seems to be little ground for anticipating any such change as long as Mao remains at the helm.

The body of this paper consists of two principal parts: The first including an analysis of the Lin declaration, the antecedents of its formulations, and its relations to classical Communist theory; and the

cont.

second consisting of a brief survey of the results of the application of "Mao's thought" on "people's war" around the world during the two years since Lin's tract appeared.

I

On 3 September 1965, all Chinese Communist media began to publicize a massive PEOPLE'S DAILY article headed "Long Live the Victory of People's War," attributed to Lin Piao, Defense Minister, Vice Premier, Vice Chairman of the CCP/CC, -- since labeled Mao's closest comrade. Scholars and journalists of the world instantly recognized this tract as a major statement of Chinese policy on world revolution, some referring to it as the Chinese parallel to Hitler's MEIN KAMPF.

The first half of this treatise -- pegged to the 20th anniversary of the Japanese defeat in WW II (which "victory was mainly the result of the Chinese people's own efforts," though they "enjoyed the support of other peoples in winning both the war of resistance against Japan and the people's liberation war") -- uses the experiences of Mao's forces in the war against the Japanese and in the "three revolutionary civil wars" to illustrate the development of Mao's "Strategy and Tactics of People's War." Then, in a section headed "The International Significance of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Theory of People's War," the article claims that the Chinese experience and Mao's thought on "people's war" are valid not only for China but for "the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and peoples throughout the world." Its main thrust can be conveyed by the following selected sentences, the last of which represents the article's noteworthy "advance" over previous Chinese statements:

"It was on the basis of the lessons derived from the people's war in China that Comrade Mao Tse-tung, using the simplest and most vivid language, advanced the famous thesis that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' He clearly pointed out: the seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution....

Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance for the present revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed nations and peoples, and particularly for...Asia, Africa, and Latin America....

...The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory....

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world,' then Asia, Africa, and Latin America constitute 'the rural areas of the world.'...In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of the cities by the rural areas...."

In the final section, a "routine" anti-Soviet polemic headed "The Khrushchev Revisionists Are Betrayers of People's War," the article re-states the Chinese intent to foment and support such people's wars throughout the world:

"In diametrical opposition to the K. revisionists, the Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people never take a gloomy view of war....As for revolutionary wars waged by the oppressed nations and peoples,...we invariably give them firm support and active aid.... When we grow in strength as time goes on, we will give them still more support and aid in the future....Only when the people in a country are awakened, mobilized, organized, and armed can they overthrow the reactionary rule of imperialism and its lackeys through struggle; their role cannot be replaced or taken over by any people from outside....Our support and aid to other revolutionary peoples serves precisely to help their self-reliant struggle...."

This colorful image of the industrialized countries as the cities of the world and the under-developed lands as the rural areas did not originate with Lin, or even with Mao. It appeared -- in a much different context -- in the 1928 Comintern Program adopted by the 6th Congress (reportedly as drafted by Bukharin), in Part IV, Section 9, "Struggle for the World Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Colonial Revolution":

"Colonial revolutions and movements for national liberation play an extremely important part in the struggle against imperialism, and in the struggle for the conquest of power by the working class. Colonies and semi-colonies are also important in the transition period because they represent the WORLD RURAL DISTRICT in relation to the industrial countries, which represent the WORLD CITY....Hence the establishment of a fraternal militant alliance with the masses of the toilers in the colonies represents one of the principal tasks the world industrial proletariat must fulfill as leader in the struggle against imperialism." (Underlining is ours: capitalized phrases are italicized in Moscow's English text.)

The Comintern leaders were clearly thinking only in terms of the CITY (industrial countries) as the base and the industrial proletariat as the bearers of the world revolution, which they must carry to the RURAL AREAS, -- and this is still the Marxist-Leninist concept as interpreted by the CPSU and its followers.

Mao reversed the Comintern concept in practice from his early Yen'an years through the climax of his revolutionary sweep across China in 1949, which was a model example of the encirclement of the cities from the countryside. However, (except for a brief fling in 1949-1952) he always seemed reluctant to counterpose his theory as doctrine in direct contradiction to the classical concept. The Lin Piao tract, as we have seen, not only declared unequivocally that "the countryside alone" can provide the bases necessary for victorious revolution but goes a large step further to apply this Maoist "truth" on a global scale, depicting the future of world revolution as a process of the establishment and strengthening of more and more revolutionary bases in the WORLD RURAL AREA and the gradual encirclement and engulfing of the WORLD CITY from the countryside. (Sceptics might see in it a sign that Communists have abandoned their hope of winning in the advanced industrial countries, as formerly prophesied by Marx and Lenin.)

II

A. ASIA: The fiasco most directly traceable to Chinese maneuvering began in Indonesia less than a month after the Lin Piao declaration. Following more or less "conventional" (Soviet-style) Communist tactics internally (and greatly bolstered by the billion-dollar Soviet military aid granted to Sukarno), the PKI leaders had achieved remarkable results in building up the Party (from near liquidation in 1948 in the aftermath of a premature attempt at armed revolution) to the numerically largest CP outside the "socialist camp," with Communists increasingly occupying strategic positions in Sukarno's government and excellent prospects for a "peaceful" (East-European-style) takeover in the not-too-distant future. But, seemingly spurred on by "Mao's thought" (perhaps even influenced directly by the Lin Piao declarations, which cited Mao to the effect that "seizure of power by armed force...is the highest form of revolution") and impatiently overestimating their military strength, they reached for their (Chinese-supplied) guns and started shooting. The result was a catastrophe for the entire Communist world: the PKI and its entire structure of allied and captive organizations and institutions were annihilated in a blood bath which may have taken hundreds of thousands of lives; Sukarno and all left-leaning figures were ousted from any positions of influence in the now military-controlled government; and innumerable ChiCom sympathizers in other lands turned either to the Soviet-aligned local opposition or abandoned Communism itself.

The Japanese CP, the next most important non-ruling party in the Far East and until then a staunch supporter of the CCP, moved over to a position nominally independent and "neutral" between the CPSU and CCP, but with increasingly sharp criticism of the latter: although other factors contributed to the shift, it is clear that the repercussions of the debacle in Indonesia played a major role. Much the same could be said of the North Korean ruling party, although it has refrained from the sharp criticism which has appeared in JCP media. North Vietnamese need for Chinese assistance alone should be sufficient to inhibit any open show of disaffection with "Mao's thought," but observers have recently pointed to various Hanoi articles and statements which are interpreted as veiled criticism of various aspects of Chinese practice.

Notwithstanding these costly failures, the Chinese continue to broadcast calls to armed revolt in most of their neighboring Asian countries, furnishing tangible assistance to guerrillas in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines (in addition to North Vietnam and Laos), and contributing tangibly to subversion in most of the others.

B. AFRICA: De-colonialization in Africa suddenly deprived dozens of new states of the protection formerly rendered by the relatively sophisticated administrators and police of the colonial powers and forced them to practice independence under inexperienced and often inadequately trained governments. This obviously converted vast WORLD RURAL AREAS into highly vulnerable new targets for Communist infiltration and takeover, and both the Chinese and Soviet Bloc regimes moved in to take advantage of the openings. Results have been varied and far from conclusive thus far, but the record has been largely one of failure or disappointing (to the Communists) achievement. The first fiasco was suffered by the Soviets, as they rushed headlong into the chaos following Belgium's precipitous pull-out from the Congo; but they grossly overplayed their cards and were soon bounced out completely. Apparently learning their lesson, they have been more discreet, subtle, and cautious in their activities ever since.

The Chinese made their major play in Nkrumah's Ghana where the Soviets, East Germans and most other Communist countries also established a considerable presence. By the time Lin Piao's tract went to press, Ghana seemed to be well on the way toward becoming the first and principal "revolutionary base" for Africa. In 1964 the Chinese concluded an agreement with Nkrumah's Bureau of African Affairs to organize and conduct courses in guerrilla warfare for African "Freedom Fighters," -- to be used against the regimes of other independent African countries (included were personnel from Nigeria, Niger, Congo/Kinshasa, and Tanzania/Zanzibar) as well as colonial territories (Angola and Mozambique were represented). The photostatic reproductions attached to the first Ghanaian Govt. "white book" (see references) show that the course expounded "Mao's thought" in theory as well as practice, --

including a 16-hour block of instruction on "Problems on the revolutionary road to establishing base areas in countryside and surrounding the cities from countryside!" The school, with 13 Chinese instructors, had graduated several hundred guerrillas when the 24 February 1966 coup ousted Nkrumah. The magnitude of the Communist effort at that time is indicated in this passage from the "Introduction" to the first Ghanaian "white book.":

"The liberation of Ghana was a bitter blow to all these Communists. Like animals fleeing a forest fire, they fled the country. Planes and ships took away 1,100 Russians, 430 Chinese, and scores of people from the countries already named (GDR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, North Korea, and Cuba). Among these were 22 Russians and three Chinese intelligence officers and 13 Chinese guerrilla warfare instructors who were declared persona non grata."

The Communists have also suffered set-backs on a smaller scale, with expulsions of their personnel in Kenya, Guinea, and Dahomey and with diplomatic relations broken by Burundi, the Central African Republic, and Dahomey during the two years since the Lin Piao declaration appeared: again, various factors have been involved, but it seems clear that the belligerence of the insistent Chinese call for armed revolution and people's war contributed greatly to alerting non-Communist African leaders to Chinese objectives and the dangers they bear.

Whereas in African countries where the Chinese have followed more conventional policies, concentrating on technical and construction assistance and propaganda, such as Tanzania, they have apparently achieved some real progress.

C. LATIN AMERICA: There has been no such spectacular Maoist failure in L.A., during this period, -- nor even any major attempt to apply Mao's theory of "people's war" there. (The Dominican revolt was not Maoist-inspired: in fact, it was more like the urban uprisings of the several French or Russian revolutions, with little or no support in the countryside.) A more significant difference is the development of "Castroism" -- every bit as militantly warlike but assertedly better adapted to conditions in LA -- to challenge Maoism for the devotion of the militant extremists in LA. Castro, an operator rather than a theorist, never formulated his "thought" in a systematic presentation, -- but he had it formulated by Regis Debray, a bright young

Frenchman, a Communist "romantic revolutionary" who spent much of the last 6 years in Cuba and with other Latin American Communists, especially the guerrilla leaders (and who is now in a Bolivian jail awaiting trial after having been captured by Bolivian troops hunting guerrillas). Following several long magazine articles on Castroism, Debray early this year completed an 88-page book on the subject, published in Havana under the title REVOLUTION WITHIN THE REVOLUTION?; its content has since been given wide dissemination by Cuban and other LA media. His book is essentially an analysis of why the revolutionary effort in LA has been such a failure (except for Castro in Cuba), and a formulation of "rules" for applying the Castro experience to achieve future success, in the process of which he discards both Soviet and Chinese guerrilla doctrine, including the Vietnamese experience as well. Although he labels his theory Marxist-Leninist and ventures to quote Lenin from time to time, he contends that under the conditions prevailing in LA, only Castro's experience is truly relevant there today. Like Mao, Debray believes that the revolution must develop in the countryside and eventually encircle the city, but he differs from the Chinese in at least two major respects. First, he says that the Maoist doctrine on the establishment of permanent revolutionary bases and their gradual expansion outward, with propaganda teams paving the way, is not applicable to LA (and possibly not in many other countries). It succeeded in China and Vietnam because the Communists there were favored by particularly benevolent conditions, especially by the fact that they had been "at the head of a popular resistance movement against foreign imperialists" and thus "the party had become the standard-bearer of their fatherland." Also, in those countries the rural population heavily outweighs the urban. Thus, the Chinese/Vietnamese guerrillas had a much more favorable milieu in which to work, -- in contrast to most LA countries where the government forces can much more easily track down and engage guerrilla forces before they can establish themselves securely because the peasants are ideologically disinterested or untrustworthy and usually sparsely settled. Thus, in LA the guerrillas must practice maximum mobility and isolate themselves from the people as a whole until they are able to build up enough strength to defend a permanent base in a relatively inaccessible, remote area. Propaganda?

"The destruction of a troop transport or the public execution of a police torturer is more effective propaganda for the neighboring population...than 200 speeches. Such events convince the people of the essential thing: that the revolution is a reality already in progress, and that the enemy is not invulnerable."

As the guerrilla force gathers strength, its propaganda voice will be a radio transmitter which "will be recognized by the masses as its sole interpreter and guide."

The above divergence might be tolerated more or less readily by many Communists, whether of Chinese or Soviet persuasion, but the second, which Debray calls Cuba's "decisive contribution to international revolutionary experience and Marxism-Leninism," must surely be difficult for most to stomach. Essentially, he so idealizes the guerrilla force as the bearer of revolution that he totally dismisses the need for a Communist party (as in Cuba, where "it was not the party which was the guiding cell of the people's army, but the reverse. The rebel army was the leading nucleus of the party, the nucleus which built it."):

"The guerrilla movement begins by creating unity in itself, based on the most urgent military tasks to be carried out, which are also political tasks, -- unity of those without party affiliations and all of the parties represented among the guerrilla fighters. The most decisive political definition is membership in the guerrilla force, the armed forces of liberation. Thus, little by little, this little island creates unity at the base including all parties as it grows and achieves its first victory. Finally, the future people's army will give rise to the party of which it should have theoretically have been the tool...."

Debray sees the possibility of "a divorce lasting some decades between Marxist theory and revolutionary practice" in some cases before the process is complete. Moreover, he goes on to warn against letting established parties obstruct the process;

"What we must do is to prevent the 'Marxist-Leninist' parties which do not fulfill their revolutionary duties from becoming a syndicate combining threatened interests and obstructing the inevitable development of new revolutionary forms of organization and action...."

Debray expresses his scorn of the "pro-Chinese" groups in LA, "the noisy opportunism of their political line and the hypocritical sabotage of their own official line on the subject of armed struggle." He notes that "these 'Marxist-Leninist' groups have a stature that is inversely proportional to the revolutionary situation of their countries," and adds that "these forms of 'anti-revisionist' organization find more favorable grounds in Europe, within a theoretical context," than in LA or Africa.

REFERENCES:

In addition to the voluminous material on the above developments which has appeared -- and continues to appear -- in the press and periodical literature, we reference three government-published white papers and point to several books which treat them in more detail:

NKRUMAH'S SUBVERSION IN AFRICA, Documentary Evidence of Nkrumah's Interference in the Affairs of Other African States. Published by the Ministry of Information and printed by the State Publishing Corporation, Accra-Tema, Ghana, 1966. This is the first "white book" referred to the AFRICA section above: it contains narrative description and photostatic reproductions of a select few of the documents found in Ghanaian files when the National Liberation Council toppled the Nkrumah regime.

NKRUMAH'S DECEPTION IN AFRICA. This is a sequel to the above, containing much additional information and photostatic evidence. It is identified as published by the Ghana Information Services, 1966-67.

THE MILITANT COMMUNIST THREAT TO WEST MALAYSIA. A Malaysian "white paper" issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, 1966. It reports on a government investigation of a series of Communist-front-inspired riots and demonstrations in Malaysia in 1965-66.

COMMUNISM IN AFRICA, by Fritz Schatten. New York: Praeger, 1966

DRAGON'S EMBRACE, THE, by John Hevi. London: Pell Mell, 1967

EAST WIND OVER AFRICA, by John Cooley. New York: Walker, revised (paperback) ed., 1966

FALL OF SUKARNO, THE, by Tarzie Vittachi. New York: Praeger, 1967